Beyond Good and Bad by Jimenez-Leal, William et al.
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
Beyond good and bad: Varieties of moral judgment
William Jiménez-Leal1, Samuel Murray2, Santiago Amaya3, and Sergio Barbosa1,4
1Deparment of Psychology, Universidad de los Andes
2Mind At Large Lab, Imagination and Modal Cognition Lab, Duke University
3Department of Philosophy, Universidad de los Andes
4Department of Psychology, Universidad del Rosario
Word Count: 15910.
Author Note
The first three authors contributed equally. Correspondence concerning this article should 
be addressed to William Jiménez-Leal, Universidad de los Andes. E-mail: 
w.jimenezleal@uniandes.edu.co. 
Supplementary materials (including materials, preregistrations, raw data and code) 
available at: https://osf.io/kja2u/?view_only=573c1541bbd240b397b79229704dfae7.
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                    1
Abstract1
We argue that people regularly encounter situations involving moral conflicts among 2
permissible options. These scenarios, which some have called morally charged situations, reflect 3
perceived tensions between moral expectations and moral rights. Studying responses to such 4
situations marks a departure from the common emphasis on sacrificial dilemmas and widespread 5
use of single-dimension measures. In 6 experiments (n=1607), we show that people use a wide 6
conceptual arsenal when assessing actions that can be described as suberogatory (bad but 7
permissible) or supererogatory (good but not required). In Experiment 1 we find that people 8
identify actions as suberogatory or supererogatory when using open descriptions to describe 9
them. Experiment 2 shows that they differentially assess these actions in terms of how 10
permissible, optional, and good they considered them. Experiment 3 tests the use of these11
evaluative dimensions with sacrificial dilemmas. We fail to find differences between these 12
categories when people respond to dilemmas, even when controlling for trait utilitarian 13
tendencies. By including judgments of blameworthiness and sanction, Experiments 4 and 5 14
provide additional evidence of the granularity and the moral significance of these evaluations.  In 15
Experiment 6 people offered their own explanations of their responses. Qualitative analyses 16
revealed that they frequently appeal to character traits, the presence of rights, and the absence of 17
explicit duties. Taken together these results suggest a richer spectrum of both situations and 18
concepts relevant to characterize moral judgment than moral psychologists up to this point have 19
generally recognized.20
Keywords: moral rules, moral dilemmas, suberogatory, supererogatory, duty21
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Beyond good and bad: Varieties of moral judgment22
The role of dilemmas in the science of morality23
Dilemmas have traditionally played a prominent role in the study of moral cognition. 24
While many have recently registered dissatisfaction with this state of affairs (Andrade, 2019; 25
Bauman, Mcgraw, Bartels & Warren 2014; Dahl & Oftedal, 2019; Everett & Kahane, 2020; 26
Kahane, 2020), there is considerably less said about how historically we got here. Dilemmas take 27
on this crucial role because of the assumption that morality is a system of rules. But this 28
assumption is problematic for reasons pertaining to both normative theories of morality and the 29
psychology of moral judgment.30
From its early days, psychologists interested in moral judgment understood morality as a 31
structured set of rules prohibiting and prescribing certain behaviors. Piaget (1932), for instance, 32
opened his landmark The Moral Judgment of the Child with the statement: “All morality consists 33
in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the 34
individual acquires for these rules” (1932, p. 1). Fauconnet echoes this sentiment in his 35
Responsibility, stating that moral responsibility is a “quality belonging to those who must…in 36
virtue of a rule be chosen as the passive subjects of a punishment” (1920, p. 11).37
Thinking of morality as a system of rules has several theoretical pay-offs. For one, 38
various deontic concepts can be inter-defined through rules. For example, acts are permissible if 39
and only if those acts accord with the rules, and something counts as good only if it accords with 40
the rules. Likewise, the impermissible is whatever constitutes violating a rule, and something is 41
bad insofar as doing it violates a rule (see, for example, Kanger (1971) and Anderson (1958) for 42
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two formal attempts to explain inter-definability). This, as we shall see, results in a 43
methodological advantage. If true, asking subjects whether something is impermissible, bad, or 44
in violation of a duty comes close to asking one and the same question.45
Focusing on rules also provides a concrete way to measure moral development. Under the 46
assumption that maturing moral judgment consists in possessing a greater moral understanding, 47
it is possible to define this understanding in terms of increasing aptitude in applying more 48
sophisticated evaluative rules (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). This insight famously informed the 49
stage theory of moral development (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), which identified moral 50
stages according to the kinds of rules that informed judgments: from pre-conventional rules 51
(“Doing this is bad because I can get punished”) to universal, exceptionless principles of 52
impartial justice (“Killing is wrong”).53
Moral dilemmas are one specific kind of moral encounter (Monin, Pizarro & Beer, 2007). 54
They characteristically present situations requiring decisions among impermissible options, in 55
the sense that each violates some plausible moral imperative (Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988: 29-30)56
In this respect, they isolate different sets of rules (egocentric v. altruistic, in-group v. out-group, 57
etc.) that are normally taken to inform moral cognition. Thus, by looking at the choices people 58
make in these situations or by studying how they assess the decisions made by actors depicted in 59
them, it seems possible to better understand which rules inform their judgments of goodness and 60
badness. For similar reasons, moral dilemmas also seem to provide a good instrument to measure 61
moral development and test hypotheses about individual developmental trajectories. 62
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Obviously, theories of moral cognition that fall under this rule-based tradition differ from 63
one another in important respects (see Darley & Schultz, 1990 for discussion). A sign of this are 64
the well-known controversies that exist among them.  Kohlberg’s research program, for example, 65
was criticized for the use of culturally biased materials (Simpson, 1974; Snarey, 1985), biased 66
samples (Walker, 1984) and the idea of a linear progression in moral development (Rest, 1979). 67
Others criticized the kind of dilemmas used to elicit moral judgment, focusing on the artificial 68
nature or the mundane character of them (Rosen, 1980; Bauman et al., 2014). At bottom, 69
however, many of Kohlberg’s critics agreed that morality was a system of rules that could be 70
studied by means of situations where plausible moral rules conflict with one another. They just 71
disagreed about how to properly characterize these rules and the situations that best exemplified 72
these conflicts.173
Rules and Commonsense Morality74
Some contemporary psychologists have sought to take distance from this early tradition by 75
proposing dual models of moral cognition (for discussion, see Crockett, 2013). We believe, 76
however, that these models are in an important respect a continuation of the rule-based tradition77
that has dominated the study of moral cognition. While opening up new possibilities to 78
1 One notable exception comes from feminist critiques of ethical theory. Several feminist 
ethicists have noted that the central preoccupation of moral theorizing prioritizes abstract 
principles over the particularity of ethical life (Gilligan, 1982. p. 32-38). The emphasis on 
abstract generalization obscures the details that are crucially important to a well-lived life 
(Young, 1987, p. 61-62). 
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understand the architecture of moral decision-making, the dual process paradigm has inherited 79
from its early predecessors the view of morality as a system of rules.  80
Dual models are premised on the belief that commonsense morality reflects attitudes that 81
lie on a continuum between full-blown utilitarian and deontological ethics. Differences on this 82
dimension are supposed to be explained in terms of a deep architectural divide (Bartels & 83
Pizarro, 2011; Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Djeriouat & 84
Trémolière, 2014; Holyoak & Powell, 2016; Lee & Gino, 2015). Controlled processes produce 85
characteristically utilitarian responses; intuitive processes produce characteristically 86
deontological responses (Bialek & De Neys, 2017; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Moll & 87
de Oliveira-Souza, 2007).88
Among proponents of these models, there is a standing debate as to how deep this divide 89
is. Some have interpreted it as showing that rules need not be represented as inputs to the 90
decision-making processes that culminate in moral judgment (see Blair, 1995; Greene et al., 91
2001; Haidt, 2001). Others believe that the rules are always represented, except that sometimes 92
they are only tacitly represented. (Mallon & Nichols, 2010; Mikhail, 2011). Still others have 93
proposed characterizing the divide in terms of model-based and model-free processing (Crockett 94
2013).95
These discussions, however, operate within the rule-based tradition that we wish to 96
challenge here. They concern the architectural or algorithmic processes underlying how moral 97
rules are instantiated in judgments about specific actions. Precisely because of this, they leave98
untouched the more basic assumption regarding the subject matter of morality itself. After all, 99
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the styles of thinking that are supposed to dominate commonsense morality are still 100
conceptualized in terms of systems of moral rules: either expressions of duty or prescriptions to 101
maximize or minimize some valued quantity.102
In general, moral rules can be defined as functions from relevant inputs to behavioral 103
imperatives. For example, a rule against murder is a general function from some action’s being 104
an instance of murder to an imperative against so acting. As Sidgwick (1981, p. 228) explains, 105
“…rules of duty ought to admit of precise definition in a universal form.” Under this definition, 106
many generalizations (but not all of them) count as moral rules: the prohibition not to harm 107
innocents, the injunction to maximize saved lives, etc. 108
Thus, it might be an open question whether the algorithmic processes that result in moral 109
judgments take as inputs explicit representations of these functions. It is possible that not all 110
moral decision-making is based on models shaped by a moral grammar. Be that as it may, the 111
fact is that researchers working under this new paradigm still classify the outputs of these 112
processes by conformity to the prescriptions of certain kinds of moral rules. The styles of 113
thinking modeled by them, deontology and utilitarianism, which are supposedly characteristic of 114
commonsense morality, are still styles of thinking in accordance with some distinctive moral 115
rules. 116
It is not surprising, then, that contemporary work on the psychology of moral judgment 117
continues to be dominated by moral dilemmas, in particular sacrificial dilemmas. Observing 118
people’s choices or their evaluation of the available options when each choice is made 119
impermissible by deontological or utilitarian rules seems a natural way to measure people’s 120
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attitudes in terms of these moral frameworks.  Whatever the underlying computational processes 121
are, dilemmas seem recommended by the goal of understanding whether commonsense morality 122
embodies deontological or utilitarian rules.123
In sum, there is a long tradition, spanning from Piaget to contemporary dual models, that 124
views morality as a rule-based system. Dilemmas appear useful for studying moral judgment in 125
virtue of this underlying assumption. Hence, moving beyond dilemmas requires moving beyond 126
the assumption that morality is a rule-based system. And moving beyond the assumption of 127
morality as a rule-based system requires moving beyond the study of moral judgment in 128
situations where rules conflict.129
There are, as we shall see, numerous dimensions of the moral life that are not governed 130
by rules, whether these refer to duties or codify maxims for the maximization of some valuable 131
result. Hence, a science of morality that focuses only on dilemmas and rule-based judgments 132
risks painting a picture of moral cognition that is overly narrow and stilted (Bauman et al., 2014). 133
We want to challenge the use of dilemmas to study moral judgment because we reject the 134
assumption that morality consists in a structured system of rules. Further, seeing how moral 135
cognition operates beyond the rules provides a fresh perspective for the study of moral judgment. 136
To this end, we examine in what follows moral judgment in cases of suberogatory behavior. 137
The Supererogatory and the Suberogatory138
From time to time, people are faced with the option of doing more than what they are 139
required to do, for example, spending some of their free time volunteering at the local animal 140
shelter or donating a large portion of money to charity. These actions are admirable, despite the 141
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fact that failing to do them does not seem to merit condemnation. Some classify these actions as 142
‘supererogatory’, going above and beyond the call of duty when failing to go above and beyond 143
is perfectly morally permissible (Archer, 2018).144
More controversially, people seem at times to underperform relative to some ideal in a 145
way that is permissible, for instance, not offering to proctor the exam of a sick colleague despite 146
the fact that one is available and the colleague has helped one in the past. Doing this tends to be 147
regarded as bad despite the fact that there is no rule that requires one to pick up the duties of sick 148
colleagues or that one no explicit agreement to help each other was made. Some use the label 149
‘suberogatory’ to describe this kind of behavior (see Driver, 1992; Hurd, 1998). The behavior is 150
morally objectionable but there is no well-defined duty that it violates.151
In failing to do a supererogatory action, one usually does not do anything bad. It’s an 152
admirable thing to donate money to charity, but failing to do so is not reprehensible. However, in 153
some situations, failing to do a supererogatory action constitutes suberogatory behavior. If a 154
tourist asks you for directions, you are completely within your rights to walk away without 155
saying anything. Doing it, though permissible, is bad, whereas giving directions is good despite 156
not being required. This possibility suggests a different kind of conflict that people encounter in 157
their day-to-day experiences of morality: conflicts between equally permissible good and bad 158
options. Here, we refer to these moral encounters that do not constitute real dilemmas as morally 159
charged situations. We claim that these situations, along with the concepts used to evaluate 160
them, offer a distinctive opportunity to study moral judgment.161
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Sacrificial dilemmas represent an interesting albeit limited subset of what people 162
encounter in their everyday life. Using ecological momentary assessment, Hofmann, Wisneski,163
Brandt and Skitka (2014) asked a large sample of people to report whether they had witnessed, 164
committed, or heard about a moral situation during the last hour, five times a day for three days. 165
While some situations resemble the kind of conflict expressed in sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., 166
“Reminded waitress I did not pay for my bill when she thought I did”), many of the situations 167
reported seemed more similar to the situations depicted above. The choice between the 168
competing options didn’t seem a matter of aligning oneself with some well-defined rule. 169
Over-relying on dilemmas risks papering over these distinctions and, more generally, the 170
differences between moral categories that inform varieties of moral judgment. O’Hara, Sinnott-171
Armstrong, and Sinnott-Armstrong (2010) compared responses to 15 dilemmas where they asked 172
people to rate how wrong, forbidden, inappropriate and blameworthy an action was. They found 173
that “the influence of wording variations on moral judgments was negligible” (p. 552) and they 174
analyzed the small differences found as a matter of magnitude. Likewise, many researchers treat 175
terms like ‘forbidden’ or ‘blameworthy’ as linguistic variations of some homogenous moral 176
judgment (Bjorklund, 2003; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene et al., 2001b; Koenigs et 177
al., 2012). The assumption is that common sense moral judgment is not granular enough to 178
reflect differences between being forbidden, blameworthy, bad, and so on. It is, instead, 179
monolithic cognitive product, to which different labels provide different access points. 180
While there have been calls to more carefully use these measures (Christensen & Gomila, 181
2012; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007) it is unclear what the rationale for using different terms 182
could be (cf. Cushman, 2008; Barbosa & Jiménez-Leal, 2017). But, once the repertoire of moral 183
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encounters is expanded to include non-dilemma situations, it is possible that nuances and 184
variability in moral cognition will emerge. In sum, by expanding the kind of moral encounters 185
used when empirically probing people’s intuitions and by enlarging the dimensions along which 186
these encounters are assessed we can more adequately study the variation and granularity of 187
moral judgment.188
Here we present 6 experiments that study moral judgments in non-dilemma situations. 189
One key feature of these situations is that the correct choice—if there is one—is not obviously 190
settled by appealing to rules. Experiment 1 is an exploratory study that maps out the descriptions 191
people offer of different situations. We find that people describe situations as suberogatory (‘bad 192
but permissible’) or supererogatory (‘good but not required’) when supplying open descriptions 193
of them. Experiment 2 shows that judgments of good/bad, permissible/impermissible, and 194
optional/obligatory dissociate when evaluating suberogatory and supererogatory situations. We 195
also find that people’s beliefs about duties negligibly correlate with judgments of goodness, 196
permissibility, obligation, and blame. In Experiment 3, we compare judgments in sacrificial 197
dilemmas to see whether the same distinctions appear. We do not find the same dissociations, 198
which suggests that eliciting these patterns of judgment requires more than giving participants 199
the options to judge along various dimensions. In Experiment 4, we included a measure of 200
praise/blame to see whether it correlates with the main “erogatory” measures. In Experiment 5, 201
we replicated previous findings by using different vignettes that describe more characteristically 202
moral situations adapted from classic philosophical thought experiments about abortion and 203
property rights. We also measured whether beliefs about rights predict any kind of judgment. We 204
find the same pattern of dissociations in these different vignettes and again find a negligible 205
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correlation between judgments and individual beliefs about rights. In Experiment 6, we 206
conducted a qualitative study to begin exploring the variety of factors that differentially drive 207
different judgments. Using independent coders for a qualitative analysis, we find that people 208
describe these situations using the language of character traits and rights rather than duties. In 209
fact, in many cases people explicitly state the absence of duties to do anything in our scenarios210
A methodological coda: Even though this research is mostly exploratory, its ideas are 211
developed against a backdrop of well-established findings in moral psychology. We decided to 212
preregister Experiments 2 to 6 because we believe that clearly establishing design and analysis 213
plans can help distinguish the confirmatory and exploratory aspects of our research by clearly 214
specifying our intent. The procedure, therefore, reduces needless post hoc interpretations (Nosek 215
et al, 2019).2 Materials, data, preregistrations and code for all experiments are available on the 216
OSF page of the project 217
(https://osf.io/kja2u/?view_only=573c1541bbd240b397b79229704dfae7). The IRB of the 218
University (blinded for review) approved this study.219
2 The only important deviation from preregistration plans occurred in Experiment 2, where the 
main statistical analysis proposed (a repeated measures ANOVA) was replaced by a mixed linear 
model, since it is better suited to model our data. 
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Experiment 1220
The objective of this first study is exploratory. We presented participants with vignettes 221
describing either suberogatory or supererogatory behavior. They were instructed to select words 222
from a list to describe these scenarios and to offer a description in their own words. The goal of 223
this is twofold. The first is to see what language people use to spontaneously describe a moral 224
encounter. The second is to see whether people recognize a distinction between different 225
judgment categories that maps onto the complex category of suberogatory. This requires that 226
people have distinct concepts of permissibility and goodness such that they can describe some 227
behavior as bad but permissible. Hence, we decided to run an exploratory study using word 228
selection and open response to see whether participants utilize the moral categories we aim to 229
study without being prompted.230
We expected people to always select always more than one word (e.g., “good”) and to 231
give descriptions that characterize both the action and the person. 232
Method233
Participants234
95 participants (60 women and 35 men, mean age = 32.42, SD =10.43), based in the 235
United States and recruited through Prolific Academic, took part in the study in exchange for 40 236
pence. Participants were aware that their answers would be anonymous and were monetarily 237
compensated for their participation. The average completion time was 5.2 minutes.238
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Materials and procedure239
We constructed four scenarios, some of which were based on thought experiments by240
Driver (1992). Each scenario described an individual faced with a choice between a suberogatory 241
and a supererogatory option. Additionally, in order to account for possible asymmetries between 242
actions and omissions (Haidt & Baron 1996), we created two versions of each scenario that 243
describe either an action or an omission. This generated eight vignettes, described below 244
(suberogatory versions of these vignettes are in brackets):245
Two newlyweds are boarding a plane to go on their honeymoon. Because of a booking error 246
by the airline, the couple does not have seats together. They ask someone, already seated, if they would switch 247
seats so the couple could sit together. The passenger switches seats, and the newlyweds can sit together. [The 248
passenger does not switch seats, and the newlyweds have to sit separately.]249
Alex is suffering from severe kidney failure and Alex’s only hope is to obtain a transplanted 250
kidney. Alex’s cousin, Jamie, is the only known compatible donor. Jamie offers to donate the kidney to Alex. [Jamie 251
does not offer to donate the kidney to Alex.]252
Early one Sunday morning when the neighbors are usually sleeping, Sam notices that the lawn 253
needs to be mowed. Although it is his property and it would be inconvenient to do it later, he decides to not mow 254
the lawn. He knows that starting the lawn mower will probably wake up the neighbors. [Even though he knows 255
that starting the lawn mower will probably wake up the neighbors, he does it anyway. It’s his property and it will be 256
inconvenient to mow the lawn later.]257
During the Christmas party, the secretary publicly announced the results of the office raffle: 258
“Congratulations to Alex, who has won the trip for two to Disney World. She can come up front to claim her prize 259
or she can let a cash equivalent go to a hurricane relief fund”. After hearing the news, Alex looked excited: “. Even 260
though I have the winning ticket and Disney World sounds fun, I am going to donate the prize to one of the 261
Newlyweds
Kidney
Mowing
Raffle
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charities.” [After hearing the news, Alex looked excited: “I have the winning ticket! Even though I don’t really care 262
much about Disney World, I am going to claim the prize anyway”.]263
Participants were presented with four out of the eight possible variations, so each 264
participant was presented with a suberogatory omission, a suberogatory action, a supererogatory 265
omission, and a supererogatory action. After reading the vignettes, participants completed a word 266
selection task by selecting “the word(s) that you think best describe the situation.” The word 267
choices were: “permissible”, “impermissible”, “required”, “good”, “obligatory”, “allowed”, 268
“bad”, “optional” and “compulsory”. Participants also completed an open description task by 269
offering a description of the situation in their own words. The vignette presentation order was 270
counterbalanced and the order of tasks and words was randomized.271
Results272
For the word selection task, participants selected 2.6 words on average (see Figure 1). For 273
suberogatory behaviors, people most often chose the words “optional” (27%) and “allowed” 274
(25%), followed by “permissible” (21%). For supererogatory behaviors, “good” (35%), 275
“optional” (28%), and “allowed” (14%) were the most common choices. “Allowed” and 276
“optional” are the most common pair of words used across all vignettes. “Allowed” and 277
“permissible” are more strongly associated with evaluating suberogatory behaviors. Figure 1 278
summarizes these results.279
280
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281
Figure 1. Mosaic plot for words selection. Height is associated with overall selection frequency282
and width is associated with prevalence for suberogatory and superogatory behaviors (Hornik,283
Zeileis & Meyer, 2006). Darker shades and solid lines represent positive associations, whereas 284
lighter shades and dotted lines represent a negative association within the sub/supererogatory 285
categories. The plot represents a model contrasting observed and expected frequencies of word 286
choices. 287
288
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In the open descriptions, participants predominantly used character trait descriptors, such 289
as selfish for the suberogatory vignettes and thoughtful for the supererogatory situation (see 290
Figure 2). They rarely used words like “permissible”. Also, more nuanced descriptions of the 291
suberogatory situations generally highlighted the optionality of the response, in line with the 292
abstract concept of the suberogatory: “he is allowed to do it” (mowing), “Jamie has a right to her 293
own decision” (Kidney), “it is understandable” (kidney). Lastly, people were generally sensitive 294
to the different moral aspects that structure the situations depicted as morally charged.  They 295
were, for instance, quick to describe the action/person negatively (mean, rude, etc), while also 296
recognizing that rights and expectations were at play in the scenarios evaluated. They also 297
recognized the possibility that some behaviors could be bad but permissible.:298
• “It is a little bit selfish, but then again she has the right to keep her organs”299
• "While it was mean, the passenger has the right to refuse300
• “Rude, but it is his lawn”301
• “Giving an organ is a big thing to ask. It is something that is optional, and there is no 302
mention of Alex asking him to do it so he is not required to offer”303
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304
Figure 2. Wordcloud for suberogatory (left) and supererogatory (right) situations305
While these results are exploratory, they provide evidence that moral thinking about the 306
depicted situations is nuanced in ways that seem in line with the categories of suberogatory and 307
supererogatory and more complex that simple good/bad, obligatory/impermissible evaluations. 308
These findings made possible the use of the measures and procedures described in the 309
subsequent experiments.310
Experiment 2311
In Experiment 1, we found some evidence that people describe certain moral situations in 312
ways that are sensitive to the categories of the suberogatory and the supererogatory. This 313
suggests that people distinguish between permissibility, obligation, and goodness. Here we test 314
for quantifiable differences between these evaluative categories.315
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We asked people to rate the sub– and supererogatory situations along three dimensions: 316
good/bad, permissible/impermissible, and obligatory/optional. We manipulated the Erogation 317
category (within-subjects, sub– and supererogatory) and the Situation Type (between-subjects, 318
action or omission). We hypothesized that people would judge suberogatory situations as worse 319
than supererogatory situations, but that permissibility and obligatoriness ratings between the two 320
situations would not be significantly different. We also expected permissibility ratings to be321
significantly higher than obligatoriness ratings in both supererogatory and suberogatory 322
conditions, though the difference between permissibility and obligation would be greater in the 323
suberogatory condition than in the supererogatory condition. We did not expect any differences 324
between judging actions and omissions. We also collected data on attitudes towards duties, 325
expecting that ratings along the Erogation category would be associated with these attitudes. 326
Participants327
We ran a power analysis for a mixed ANOVA (between-within interaction), assuming an effect 328
size of f = 0.15 using the software G*Power. This analysis suggested a sample size of 272 for a 329
0.95 power. To account for exclusions, we recruited 311 participants (186 women and 125 men, 330
mean age = 32.77, SD =11.18) through Prolific Academic. We decided to switch to an 331
alternative data strategy after collecting the data, using mixed linear models, given the problems 332
of repeated measures analyses with independence and distributional assumptions (Singmann & 333
Kellen, 2019). Our sample size, however, is consistent with a power of 0.9, assuming 334
participants can be treated as a random factor to account for within-person response variability, 335
with a mixed design (Singmann & Kellen, 2019; Westfall, 2015; See Supplementary materials 336
for details).337
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Each person voluntarily participated in the study and received 38 pence as compensation. 338
The average completion time was 3.11 minutes.339
Materials and procedure340
Materials were the same as Experiment 1. Each participant saw four of eight scenarios. 341
We manipulated the moral category within participants and action/omission between 342
participants, so each participant saw two supererogatory situations and two suberogatory 343
situations, where all of them were either actions or omissions. For each vignette, participants 344
evaluated the situation along different dimensions with a 100-point sliding scale. The dimensions 345
included degree of permissibility (impermissible = 0, neither impermissible nor permissible = 50, 346
permissible =100), degree of goodness (bad = 0, neither good nor bad = 50, good = 100), and 347
degree of obligation (optional=0, neither optional nor obligatory = 50, obligatory = 100). The 348
dimension order was randomized across trials. The scale appeared only with the anchors, the 349
slider was always placed in the center of the scale, and participants were not given a numerical 350
representation of where they placed the slider.351
Participants viewed one vignette at a time and the sliders were placed on the same page as 352
the vignette. After completing the study, participants indicated their age, gender, and political 353
orientation (on a five-point Likert scale from very liberal to very conservative). We also 354
collected information about personal sense of duty. Participants indicated agreement with a 7-355
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with the idea that there are duties to 356
respect your neighbors, to help anybody who needs help, and to help one’s family members. 357
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Results358
Pre-registered analyses were integrated into a set of linear random effect models fitted 359
with the lme4 R library (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2019), with 360
participant as a random intercept.3 Pairwise comparisons were carried out using the emmeans 361
package (Lenth, 2020) which allows degrees of freedom to be calculated with the Kenward 362
Roger method and p values to be adjusted with the Tukey method. Confidence intervals for non-363
standardized simple differences are reported for ease of understanding. 364
Results are summarized in Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4. We fitted four nested models to 365
contrast the interactive effect of the manipulated variables (see models 1 and 2) and to test the 366
effect of differences between scenarios and endorsement of norms (models 3 and 4).  Goodness 367
of fit indicators (AIC, BIC and deviance) and the chi square test (χ2(2)=393.2, p<.0.001) favor 368
selection of model 2. Significant interactions between judgment type and condition suggest 369
differences both between and within the erogation category. Supererogatory behaviors were 370
judged as better and more permissible (M = 86.4, SD = 18.7, n = 622 and M = 82.0, SD = 20.6,371
n = 622)  than suberogatory behaviors (M = 36.6 SD = 23.3, n = 622 M = 62.2 SD = 29.7 n = 372
622) t-ratio Good: t(3411) = -34.89, p < .001, Mdiff = -49.85, 95% CI [-52.2, -47.5] and t-ratio373
Permissible: t(3411) =-19.7, p < .001, Mdiff = -19.78, 95% CI [-22.6, -17.0], regardless of whether 374
3 It can be argued that the data of this experiment could be considered a cross-classified data set. 
However, the items in each situation type are not completely equivalent, which makes the 
corresponding items nested within situation type. Additional models were fitted with additional 
random term but since results are equivalent, we restrict the presentation here to the different 
conditions as fixed effects.
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they were actions or omissions. Supererogatory behaviors were judged to be marginally more 375
obligatory (i.e., less optional) (M = 30.9, SD = 32.7, n = 622) than the corresponding 376
suberogatory responses (M = 23.5, SD = 26.3, n = 622) t-ratio: t(3411) = -7.47, p < .001, Mdiff = -377
7.47, 95% CI [-10.8, -4.19] though it is clearly a smaller effect. 378
Interestingly, the size of the differences between permissibility and goodness ratings are 379
vastly different when looking at sub and supererogatory responses. Within the suberogatory 380
responses, this difference amounts to 25.6 points (Cohen’s d = 0.96) while for the supererogatory 381
category, this difference is only 4.46 points (Cohen’s d = 0.22). That is, goodness and 382
permissibility judgements are very similar within the supererogatory condition, but not for the 383
suberogatory responses, where they are more clearly tracking different aspects of the situation.384
385
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Table 1. Summary of Models fitted for Experiment 2386
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Omission -2.74*** -6.411*** -7.33*** -7.26***
(-4.65, -0.83) (-10.500, -2.322) (-10.41, -4.24) (-10.36, -4.17)
OBLIGATORY -34.30*** -17.449*** -38.12*** -38.12***
(-36.41, -32.20) (-21.389, -13.509) (-41.07, -35.17) (-41.07, -35.17)
PERMISSIBLE 10.57*** 21.758*** 7.58*** 7.57***
(8.47, 12.67) (17.818, 25.698) (4.63, 10.53) (4.62, 10.52)
SUPER EROGATORY 25.70*** 50.771*** 25.70*** 25.70***
(23.98, 27.41) (46.830, 54.711) (23.99, 27.41) (23.98, 27.41)
Mowing -7.48*** -7.48*** -7.47***
(-9.90, -5.05) (-9.89, -5.06) (-9.89, -5.05)
Newlyweds -3.97*** -3.97*** -3.96***
(-6.39, -1.54) (-6.39, -1.55) (-6.39, -1.54)
Raffle -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
(-2.58, 2.26) (-2.58, 2.26) (-2.57, 2.26)
DUTY TO FAMILY -0.21
(-0.99, 0.56)
DUTY TO HELP -0.01
(-0.79, 0.77)
DUTY TO NEIGHBORS -0.31
(-1.35, 0.71)
Omission: OBLIGATORY 8.75*** 7.72*** 7.718***
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(3.15, 14.35) (3.53, 11.91) (3.526, 11.91)
Omission: PERMISSIBLE 7.75*** 6.04*** 6.042***
(2.15, 13.35) (1.85, 10.23) (1.85, 10.23)
Omission: SUPER EROGATORY -1.84
(-7.44, 3.76)
OBLIGATORY: SUPER EROGATORY -41.34***
(-46.92, -35.77)
PERMISSIBLE: SUPER EROGATORY -28.36***
(-33.93, -22.78)
Omission: OBLIGATORY: SUPER
EROGATORY -2.07
(-9.99, 5.84)
Omission: PERMISSIBLE: SUPER
EROGATORY -3.419
(-11.34, 4.50)
Constant 52.90*** 39.74*** 55.17*** 58.14***
(50.41, 55.40) (36.86, 42.62) (52.41, 57.94) (51.41, 64.87)
N 3732 3732 3732 3732
Log Likelihood -17580.00 -17367.00 -17570.00 -17569.00
AIC 35180.00 34763.00 35163.00 35168.00
BIC 35242.00 34850.00 35238.00 35261.00
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
387
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Our results do, however, show that people strongly distinguish between goodness, 388
permissibility, and obligation. Participants rated supererogatory behaviors as good, optional, and 389
permissible; they rated suberogatory behaviors as bad, optional, and permissible. Despite both 390
being rated permissible, supererogatory behaviors were rated as more permissible than 391
suberogatory behaviors.392
393
Figure 3. Scores by type of judgment. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.394
We found a smaller interaction between judgment type and the action/omission dimension 395
across erogation conditions. Actions were rated as better (M = 65.1, SD = 32.7, n = 628) than 396
omissions (M =57.8, SD = 32.3, n = 616) t-ratio: t(1539 ) = 4.82, p = .001, Mdiff = 7.33, 95% CI 397
[3.71, 10.94], but there were no differences between permissibility and obligatory ratings for 398
actions and omissions. The three-way interaction is not explored here but overall, there are no 399
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important differences between erogation categories across the action/omission condition except 400
for the goodness judgment, where actions are judged as better than omissions. 401
We explored the association between ratings for each type of judgment and participant’s 402
endorsement of statements about personal duties. We did not find any consistent association 403
between judgment scores and responses pertaining to personal duties (see Table 2). There are 404
significant correlations between endorsing different statements of personal duty (ranging from 405
0.13 to 0.34) but most correlations between sense of personal duty and different judgment 406
categories were negligible (from -.01 to 0.07) and non-significant. The one exception is that 407
beliefs about duties to help others significantly correlated with judgments of permissibility, but 408
the correlation is very small.409
Table 2. Bivariate correlations between personal norms and judgment scores 410
Permissible Good Obligatory Duty to neighbors
Duty to 
help
Permissible 
Good 0.55***
Obligatory -0.24** -0.22***
Duty to neighbors -0.03 0.0 -0.02
Duty to help -0.07** -0.02 0.07 0.33***
Duty to family -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.30*** 0.23***
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Breaking down responses by scenario reveals some variability across vignettes (see Figure411
4). For example, while donating a kidney to a cousin is judged to be better and more permissible 412
than not donating a kidney, the same pattern does not hold in the raffle scenario. In this case, both 413
situations are equally permissible, but donating the raffle prize is better than not. Notice however 414
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that these small differences do not account for significant variance, according to the model fitting 415
presented in Table 1. 416
417
418
Figure 4. Scores by type of judgment and scenario. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals419
Discussion420
These results reveal quantifiable differences between different evaluative categories that are 421
employed in moral judgment. Similar to our results in Experiment 1, we found that judgments of 422
permissibility, obligation, and goodness dissociate when people make judgments of suberogatory 423
behavior. This shows that including additional measures allows variability in moral judgment to 424
emerge. Moreover, beliefs about personal duties were negligibly correlated with different kinds 425
of judgments. This suggests that people’s responses to these situations are not indicative of an 426
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underlying adherence to rules or generalized statements about what one ought to do, even though 427
the duties we asked about specifically applied to the scenarios in the study.428
We mentioned in the Introduction that the use of dilemmas to study moral judgment 429
reinforces assumptions about the way to measure moral judgment. When assessing the 430
relationships between different measures, researchers have found negligible differences between 431
different judgment categories. We see now that including different measures of moral judgment 432
allows for variability, challenging a central assumption about the relationship between different 433
measures of moral judgment. This raises a question: is the lack of variability between judgment 434
categories a function of the measures used to study moral judgment, or the dilemmas commonly 435
used to elicit judgments? It might be the case that some measurement devices function as self-436
reinforcing demand effects. Alternatively, there might be something about dilemmas themselves 437
that make a difference to moral judgment independently of the measures used. To begin 438
answering these questions, we applied our measures to sacrificial dilemmas in Experiment 3 to 439
see how they align with the results of this experiment.440
Experiment 3441
In this experiment, we consider different kinds of judgments in cases of sacrificial 442
dilemmas. In our previous experiments, we found dissociations between different kinds of 443
judgments. However, the situations used to test these differences differ significantly from 444
sacrificial dilemmas, the stimuli most consistently used to elicit moral judgments. First, harm to 445
another agent is unavoidable in a sacrificial dilemma, so there is no straightforward possibility of 446
supererogatory behavior. Second, despite being unrealistic, they elicit distinctive emotional 447
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reactions (Christensen et al., 2014) as measured by arousal and valence. Third, dilemmas are 448
situations where explicit rules come into conflict (e.g., prohibitions against causing harm and 449
prohibitions against allowing easily preventable harm). 450
We chose sacrificial dilemmas that have been widely used in empirical studies of moral 451
judgment. Based on an analysis from Christensen et al. (2014), we selected dilemmas that 452
produce the greatest variation in responses (varying in the use of personal force and the 453
inevitability of harm). We also excluded dilemmas where various interactive effects might 454
plausibly drive moral judgments (e.g., when causing harm is self-beneficial). Characteristics and 455
full text of the dilemmas selected are presented in the supplemental materials.456
Sacrificial dilemmas are sometimes thought to bring out the contrasts between 457
deontological and utilitarian ethical intuitions, because each set of intuitions usually recommends 458
different behaviors in the face of a sacrificial dilemma. Hence, intuitions about what is right or 459
appropriate indicate alignment with one or the other theory. This suggests that people committed460
(implicitly or explicitly) to either utilitarianism or deontology might produce different moral 461
judgments in reaction to sacrificial dilemmas. This presents a challenge. Because we are 462
measuring for dissociations among different judgment categories, and different normative 463
theories make different recommendations for navigating dilemmas, it is possible that each side 464
will cancel the other out, thereby giving the appearance of similarity between judgment 465
categories. To ensure that people with utilitarian tendencies do not cancel out people with 466
deontological tendencies, we used the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (Kahane et al., 2018) to assess 467
trait utilitarianism across two dimensions of utilitarianism, impartial beneficence and 468
instrumental harm. 469
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The character of this study is primarily exploratory but we expected to replicate some of 470
the main findings in this literature and some of the patterns observed by Christensen et al. (2014). 471
We expected utilitarian responses in personal dilemmas to be associated with lower ratings of 472
goodness and permissibility relative to impersonal dilemmas (Greene et al. (2001b). We also 473
expected behaviors that cause unavoidable deaths to be judged as better than situations where 474
causing death was avoidable (Christensen et al., 2014). 475
Method476
Participants477
Given that our objective was to first to replicate the observed effects with sacrificial 478
dilemmas and, second, to explore the impact of these variables on our new measures, we ran 479
power analysis for a linear mixed model treating participants as random effects, using the effect 480
size reported by Christensen et al (2014) for personal force of r = .75 (equivalent to a d = 2.2). 481
This is the smallest of the effect sizes considered. This analysis suggested a sample of 60 482
participants for our mixed design for a power of .99 (Westfall, 2015).  Since we wanted to make 483
sure we would be able to observe differences in our new dependent variables, we aimed to collect 484
data for 300 participants which would allow us to observe a significantly smaller effect (r = .17, d 485
= .3). 304 participants (153 women and 151 men, mean age = 33.21, SD =11.62), recruited 486
through Prolific Academic, took part in the study in exchange for 0.50 pence. The average 487
completion time was of 7.21 minutes and none of the participants had taken part in our previous 488
experiments.489
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Materials and procedure490
Participants saw the four dilemmas and were randomly presented with the version where 491
the main character decides to cause harm (utilitarian response) or allow harm (deontological 492
response). That is, utilitarian/deontological response was a between-subject factors while 493
avoidability of the result (avoidable/unavoidable) and personal force (personal/impersonal) were 494
within subject variables. For each scenario, participants judged the main character’s response 495
along dimensions of permissibility, obligation, goodness, and blameworthiness using the same 496
sliders as before. After judging the dilemmas, participants were presented with the items of the 497
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) in a random order. Finally, they are asked some basic 498
demographic questions and were asked to rate their experience with this kind of dilemmas in a 499
scale from 1 (not at all familiar) to 5 (extremely familiar).500
Results501
Results are summarized in Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6. As before, we fitted a set of502
random effect models with judgment type, personal/impersonal utilitarian/deontological, 503
avoidable/unavoidable, having experience with dilemmas and the score in the OUS as fixed 504
predictors allowing for a random effect of participant. Pairwise comparisons were calculated with 505
the same parameters specified for Experiment 2. The OUS had good reliability for its both 506
subscales (Instrumental Harm Cronbachs’ α = .65 and Impartial Beneficence Cronbachs’ α = 507
.72). The models differed in the specification of the interaction of the fixed effects. The best 508
fitting model has interactive effects for two-way interactions for all terms with the 509
personal/impersonal dimension. This model is presented in Table 3. 510
Table 3. Best fitting model for Experiment 3.511
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score
BLAME -5.15**
(-9.53,	-0.77)
OBLIGATORY -2.98
(-7.36,	1.40)
PERMISSIBLE 12.78***
(8.40,	17.16)
PERSONAL 9.22***
(5.40,	13.04)
UTILITARIAN 2.46
(-1.03,	5.95)
UNAVOIDABLE 2.90*
(-0.55,	6.35)
BLAME:	PERSONAL 4.49**
(0.13,	8.85)
OBLIGATORY:	PERSONAL -4.91**
(-9.27,	-0.55)
PERMISSIBLE:	PERSONAL -4.95**
(-9.31,	-0.59)
PERSONAL:	UTILITARIAN -14.00***
(-17.19,	-10.82)
BLAME:	UNAVOIDABLE 0.23
(-4.13,	4.59)
OBLIGATORY:	UNAVOIDABLE -1.82
(-6.18,	2.54)
PERMISSIBLE:	UNAVOIDABLE -4.94**
(-9.30,	-0.58)
PERSONAL:	UNAVOIDABLE -4.89***
(-7.98,	-1.81)
BLAME:	UTILITARIAN 6.82***
(2.46,	11.19)
OBLIGATORY:	UTILITARIAN 1.50
(-2.86,	5.86)
PERMISSIBLE:	UTILITARIAN -2.37
(-6.74,	1.99)
Constant 47.87***
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(44.53,	51.21)
N 4864
Log	Likelihood -23017.00
AIC 46074.00
BIC 46204.00
***p	<	.01;	**p	<	.05;	*p	<	.1
There are significant main effects of judgment type and the utilitarian status of the response512
judged (Deontological, M = 52.39, SD = 28.3  and Utilitarian M = 49.18, SD = 28.4, , t(3924) 513
=3.77, p <.001, Mdiff =3.21, 95% CI [1.61, 4.80] ), but not of its being personal (Personal M = 514
51.64, SD = 25.8, and Impersonal M = 49.87, SD = 30.8, n = 2432, t(3411) =1.99, p =.046, Mdiff515
=1.77, 95% CI [0.17, 3.37] ) or avoidable (Avoidable M = 51.46, SD = 25.01, and unavoidable M516
= 50.04, SD = 31.4, n = 2432, t(3411) =1.49, p =.13, Mdiff = 1.42, 95% CI [-0.17, 3.02]). These 517
variables only have interactive effects, which shows that there is not an overall effect of the 518
manipulation across all judgment dimensions.519
Figure 5 shows how personal deontological responses are judged as better (M = 61.75, SD 520
= 28.89, n = 303), considerably more permissible (M = 65.76, SD = 28.56, n = 303), more 521
obligatory (M = 51.38, SD = 33.94, n = 303) and less blameworthy (M = 42.31, SD = 27.59, n = 522
303) than the corresponding utilitarian responses (Good M = 39.19, SD = 28.12, n = 305, 523
Permissible M = 43.54, SD = 31.06, n = 305, Obligatory M = 36.53, SD = 31.23, n = 305, and 524
blame M = 60.01, SD = 27.22, n = 305) but only for the unavoidable outcomes (all pairwise 525
comparison significant at 0.01). When the outcome is avoidable, the pattern is the opposite for 526
both impersonal and personal responses. The main effect of personal contact consists in making 527
the deontological response more acceptable (less blameworthy, more obligatory, better and more 528
permissible) than the corresponding utilitarian ratings (See lower panel, Figure 5). Overall this 529
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picture is consistent with prior findings where the effect of these variables on dilemma responses 530
is conditional on several factors (See Christensen et al. (2014)).531
532
533
Figure 5. Mean ratings for each judgment type by utilitarian status, personal force and 534
avoidable. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 535
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In the model fitting process, neither experience with dilemmas nor the overall score of the 536
OUS (or its subscales) resulted in significant predictors of participant judgments. Moreover, for 537
all but one dilemma type (Unavoidable, Personal) we did not find significant differences between 538
judgments across trait utilitarian tendencies.539
We wanted to see, however, whether more fine-grained distinctions in trait utilitarianism 540
might allow unnoticed dissociations to emerge. To do this, we assigned participants to a low, 541
medium and high utilitarianism group, by splitting participants aggregate scores on the OUS by 542
the 33rd and 66th percentile. Zooming in on participants with the lowest and highest utilitarian 543
scores (See Figure 6), we see that participants in the Low Utilitarianism Group (left panel) clearly 544
judge causing harm as less permissible, less optional, and more blameworthy than allowing harm.  545
People in the High Utilitarianism Group (right panel) show an opposite pattern, albeit not as 546
distinctive (See Supplemental materials for more information on these comparisons). Note, 547
however, that these patterns only emerge after making exploratory, post-hoc data analyses. Even 548
doing this, which might otherwise be considered methodologically problematic, we weren’t able 549
to see the clearly marked dissociations observed in Experiment 2.  550
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551
Figure 6. Mean ratings by of judgment, grouped by Utilitarianism level (panels) and 552
Utilitarian response (bars) 553
Permissibility judgments tend to be higher than goodness judgments, suggesting that even 554
though they are related, their difference in magnitude suggests that these judgments are tracking 555
different features of the actions depicted in the scenario. This difference is larger and statistically 556
significant for participants with low utilitarian tendencies, who consider harm relatively more 557
permissible (M = 50.95, SD = 30.51) than it is good (M = 44.55, SD = 27.23, , t(448) =-2.36, p -558
=.02, Mdiff =-6.40, 95% CI [-11.72, -1.08]). With participants who score in the higher end of 559
utilitarianism, there is virtually no difference between these judgments (permissibility M = 56.02, 560
SD = 27.52 vs obligatoriness M = 55.35, SD = 26.71, , t(338) =-0.23, p =.81, Mdiff =-0.66, 95% 561
CI [-5.45, 5.12]). A similar pattern is found with the obligatoriness levels: participants who score 562
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low in utilitarianism consider causing harm optional (as revealed by a one-sample t test against 563
the indifference point M = 37.09, SD = 31.02, t(227) =-6.79, p <.001, 95% CI [33.98, 41.10]) and 564
participants who score high in utilitarianism consider not causing harm as optional  (M = 44.20, 565
SD = 29.81, t(169) =-0.69, p =.48, 95% CI [43.70, 73.0]). These tendencies are statistically 566
significant when explored with a fixed effects model with these terms (see Supplementary 567
materials). Bear in mind that this model is exploring a tendency rather than testing a hypothesis. 568
As such, it lacks confirmatory value.569
Discussion570
We wanted to see whether adding additional measures allowed variability in moral judgment to 571
emerge, even when using dilemmas as stimuli. However, when we had people make judgments 572
about dilemmas, the variability we observed in Experiment 2 nearly disappears. This is not an 573
effect driven by Utilitarian members of the participant pool. Even when we separate people 574
according to their utilitarian tendencies (which tendencies pull against making the distinctions 575
outlined in Experiment 2), we do not find strong dissociations between the categories of 576
goodness, permissibility, and obligation. The dissociations are weak enough that they might 577
seemingly justify the claim that “the influence of wording variations on moral judgments was 578
negligible” (O’Hara et al., 2010).579
Our results suggest that changes in measurement alone are not sufficient to indicate the 580
underlying complexity of moral judgment. The kind of situation being evaluated makes a 581
difference to moral judgment. When we limit ourselves to using only dilemmas, we generate an 582
overly narrow view of moral thinking. Worse, it hinders the ability to make useful generalizations 583
about the operations of moral cognition in general.584
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The lesson is that we need more than different measures. The situation being evaluated 585
appears to have an influence on the shape of moral judgment. Our materials in Experiment 2 586
provide a first step toward expanding the range of situations used as stimuli to study moral 587
judgment. In our next two experiments, we wanted to introduce different measures and scenarios, 588
as well as explore potential connections between moral judgments and generalized rules.589
Experiment 4590
In Experiment 3 we found that judgment dimensions do not behave uniformly when used to 591
judge responses in sacrificial dilemmas. That is, utilitarian and deontological responses are 592
judged to be permissible, optional, blameworthy and good at different levels, depending on 593
variables known to impact participant responses (Christensen et al. (2014)). However, unlike the 594
pattern observed in Experiment 2, differences between categories were generally non-significant. 595
Moreover, significant differences tended to be small, to arise from interactions, and to be driven 596
mainly by individual differences in trait utilitarianism. This shows that sacrificial dilemmas do 597
not elicit differences in judgment that are found when using different erogation conditions.598
Conversely, this suggests that not all situations of moral conflict could be assessed in terms of the 599
dimensions proposed. 600
Additionally, in Experiment 3, participants made judgments of blameworthiness for the 601
response of the person allowing, or causing harm. This marks an important difference with the 602
procedure used in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, we found that individuals rate scenarios in a 603
way that reflects the categories of suberogatory and supererogatory. However, we did not find 604
that individuals rate suberogatory and supererogatory behaviors as equally permissible and 605
optional, as we had initially hypothesized, despite finding a difference in judgments of goodness.606
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One explanation of this failure might be that people disapprove of suberogatory behaviors, 607
but the various judgment types (permissibility, obligation, and goodness) do not have any 608
obvious place for people to register this disapproval. Hence, disapproval might be skewing 609
judgments in a way that drives the differences between permissibility and obligatoriness across 610
scenarios. To correct for this, and to replicate the findings of Experiment 2, we ran the 611
experiment again with an additional judgment type of blameworthiness. 612
Participants613
We recruited 311 participants (166 women and 145 men, mean age = 31.95, SD =11.00) 614
through Prolific Academic. Sample size was determined using the rationale of Experiment 2. All 615
participants voluntarily agreed to participate in the study and were monetarily compensated (38 616
pence). The average completion time was 4 minutes.617
Materials and procedure618
We used the same materials and procedures from Experiment 2. We included an 619
additional measure for participants to rate the blameworthiness of the character in the vignette620
(praiseworthy = 0, neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy = 50, blameworthy =100).621
Results622
Overall, the results replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 2 (see Figure 7). We 623
fitted the same random effect models as in Experiment 2 and performed the same pairwise 624
comparisons. Model 2, which includes the interactive effect of judgment type, omission and 625
erogation condition, was the best model. Table 4 below presents only the two best fitting models.626
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627
Table 4. Summary of Models fitted for Experiment 4628
Model	1 Model	2
Omission 3.90** 5.70***
(0.19,	7.60) (2.40,	8.90)
GOOD -19.00*** 29.00***
(-23.0,	-16.0) (26.0,	32.0)
OBLIGATORY -41.00*** -16.00***
(-45.00,	-38.00) (-19.0,	-13.0)
PERMISSIBLE 4.20** 40.0***
(0.47,	7.90) (37.00,	43.00)
SUPER EROGATORY -50.00*** 5.20***
(-53.00,	-46.00) (3.60,	6.80)
Mowing -1.0
(-4.20,	0.460)
Newlyweds -1.400
(-3.70,	0.92)
Raffle 0.260
(-2.00,	2.60)
Omission:GOOD -12.00*** -14.00***
(-18.00,	-7.20) (-19.00,	-9.30)
Omission:OBLIGATORY 3.70 0.180
(-1.50,	9.00) (-4.40,	4.80)
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Omission:PERMISSIBLE -7.90*** -10.00***
(-13.00,	-2.70) (-15.0,	-5.70)
Omission:SUPER EROGATORY 3.50
(-1.70,	8.80)
GOOD:	SUPER EROGATORY 97.00***
(92.0,	102.0)
OBLIGATORY:	SUPER EROGATORY 51.00***
(46.0,	56.0)
PERMISSIBLE:	SUPER EROGATORY 72.00***
(67.00,	77.00)
Omission:	GOOD:	SUPER EROGATORY -3.00
(-10.00,	4.40)
Omission:OBLIGATORY: SUPER EROGATORY -7.10*
(-14.0,	0.36)
Omission:PERMISSIBLE: SUPER EROGATORY -4.80
(-12.00,	2.60)
Constant 62.00*** 35.00***
(59.00,	64.00) (32.00,	38.00)
N 4976 4976
Log	Likelihood -22765.00 -23867.00
AIC 45566.00 47761.00
BIC 45683.00 47852.00
***p	<	.01;	**p	<	.05;	*p	<	.1
629
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As before, both permissibility and goodness ratings were significantly higher for the 630
supererogatory (Permissibility M = 85.4, SD = 19.5, n = 622 and goodness M =85.6,  SD = 20.9, 631
n = 622) than for the suberogatory condition (M = 63.9,  SD = 29.9, n = 616 and goodness M632
=38.0,  SD = 20.5, n = 622) permissibility: t(4580) = -16.08, p < .001, Mdiff = -21.5, 95% CI [-633
24.3, -18.7], goodness: t(4580) = -35.54, p < .001, Mdiff = -47.2, 95% CI [-49.9, -45.3]. However, 634
the difference between obligatory ratings was not replicated (t(4580) = 0.22, p = .82, Mdiff = 0.32, 635
95% CI [-2.77, 3.41]). Blame ratings differed significantly across the suberogatory and 636
supererogatory conditions. Participants rated suberogatory behaviors as more blameworthy (M =637
63.70, SD = 20.77, n = 622) than supererogatory behaviors (M = 15.76, SD = 20.62 , n = 622) 638
t(4580) = 35.82, p < .001, Mdiff = 47.9, 95% CI [45.6, 50.2]. As in Experiment 2, there are 639
significant differences between scenarios, with supererogatory responses in the Kidney scenario 640
having the highest positive scores (as better, more permissible, more praiseworthy) and 641
suberogatory responses in the Mowing scenario the most negative (as worse, less permissible, 642
less optional, and more blameworthy). 643
Blame ratings were not significantly correlated with statements about personal sense of 644
duty across either scenarios or conditions.  The same overall pattern of correlations between the 645
other ratings and statements about duties was observed (See Table 2, Experiment 2). 646
Supererogatory behaviors are consistently rated as praiseworthy, while suberogatory 647
behaviors are consistently rated as blameworthy. However, the magnitude of praiseworthiness 648
judgments is much greater in the case of supererogatory behaviors. This asymmetry suggests that 649
supererogatory behaviors deserve more praise than the corresponding suberogatory behaviors650
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                    42
deserve blame. (see Figure 7). This asymmetry has been repeatedly observed in other studies 651
(Monroe et al., 2018, Pizarro et al., 2007).652
It is worth noting that, again as in Experiment 2, there are no important differences 653
between the permissibility and goodness means in the supererogatory condition (M = 85.61, SD 654
= 20.86 vs M = 85.43, SD = 19.46 respectively) while for the suberogatory responses we find a 655
difference of 25.88 points between these (Cohen’s d = 1.01), suggesting that participants are 656
considering different information when using assessing permissibility and goodness in these 657
situations.658
659
Figure 7. Scores by type of judgment Experiment 4. Error bars represent 95% confidence 660
intervals661
Discussion662
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                    43
In this experiment, we replicated the key findings of Experiment 2. When comparing judgments 663
about suberogatory and supererogatory behaviors, people distinguish between the goodness, 664
permissibility, and blameworthiness of the action. However, people do recognize suberogatory 665
and supererogatory behaviors as equally optional. Despite statistically significant differences 666
between the permissibility of suberogatory and supererogatory actions, participants rated 667
suberogatory behaviors as permissible.668
Now that we have provided some evidence for distinctions between these evaluative 669
categories, we turn to another question: what factors differentially affect these judgments? As we 670
saw in Experiment 2, beliefs about personal duties do not relate significantly to people’s 671
judgments. The significant difference in blame judgments suggests that perhaps norms of social 672
sanctioning help to inform at least one kind of judgment. To understand the reasoning underlying 673
these judgments, we conducted two additional experiments. 674
Experiment 5675
In this experiment we explored how judgments of deserved social sanction are associated 676
with the different kinds of moral judgment identified in previous experiments. Thus far, we have 677
established that some situations can be understood in terms of suberogatory or supererogatory 678
characterizations. In order to understand people’s responses to these situations, we need to deploy 679
a richer array of judgment dimensions. In this experiment, we explored whether suberogatory 680
responses are associated with potential behavioral consequences, such as social punishment.681
Plausibly, social punishment is, as much as expressions of blame, a behavioral marker of 682
underlying moral judgment.683
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                    44
We also explore whether attitudes about rights predict different kinds of judgments. The 684
situations that we describe often bring into conflict an individual right and a kind or generous 685
thing that could be done for others. For example, someone has the right to keep the seat they paid 686
for on the airplane, but it is a kind thing to offer one’s seat when asked to switch. Because of this, 687
we thought that attitudes towards rights, instead of duties, might usefully predict moral 688
judgments. This would partially vindicate the rule-based conception of morality, as one might 689
hold that there are generalized functions from rights to prohibited behaviors (even if there are 690
fewer—if any—such functions from rights to prescribed behaviors). Moreover, we found this 691
pattern of reasoning in the open responses for Experiment 1. All of this suggests that personal 692
sense of rights might provide some details about the range of inputs to which moral judgment is 693
sensitive. 694
Participants695
309 participants (165 women and 144 men, mean age = 39.89, SD =13.76), recruited 696
through Prolific Academic, took part in the study in exchange for 60 pence. The average 697
completion time was of 4.87 minutes and none of the participants had taken part in the previous 698
experiments.699
Materials and procedure700
We used the same materials and procedures from Experiment 4 with two changes. First, 701
people had to judge whether the response merited social sanction or recognition by using a slider 702
with an underlying scale going from 0 to 100 (social sanction = 0, neither = 50, social 703
recognition=100). Second, people provided information about their attitudes towards rights by 704
answering these three questions with a 7-point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 705
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agree): 1) Everyone has a right to do anything they want on their property (as long as they are not 706
hurting anyone else); 2) Everyone has the right to bodily autonomy; 3) Everyone has a right to 707
make use of their money (or goods) as they see fit.708
Results709
As in Experiments 2 and 4, we fitted a series of random effect models which resulted in a 710
best fitting model that includes the interactive effect of judgment type, omission, erogation 711
condition and scenario. Crucially, including terms for attitudes about rights did not significantly 712
improve the fit of this model.713
Table 5. Summary of Models fitted for Experiment 5
score
Omission -8.08***
(-10.95,	-5.22)
OBLIGATORY -22.94***
(-26.74,	-19.15)
PERMISSIBLE 19.74***
(15.94,	23.54)
SANCTION -2.66
(-6.45,	1.14)
SUPER EROGATORY 44.90***
(42.21,	47.59)
Mowing -5.24***
(-8.25,	-2.24)
Newlyweds -5.14***
(-7.04,	-3.23)
Raffle 3.68**
(0.68,	6.69)
Omission: OBLIGATORY 15.28***
(9.90,	20.65)
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Omission: PERMISSIBLE 9.13***
(3.75,	14.51)
Omission: TypeSANCTION 7.98***
(2.60,	13.35)
OBLIGATORY: SUPER EROGATORY -39.76***
(-45.13,	-34.39)
PERMISSIBLE: SUPER EROGATORY -22.18***
(-27.55,	-16.81)
SANCTION: SUPER EROGATORY -14.17***
(-19.54,	-8.80)
Omission: OBLIGATORY: SUPER EROGATORY -3.29
(-10.90,	4.31)
Omission: PERMISSIBLE: SUPER EROGATORY -5.62
(-13.22,	1.99)
Omission: SANCTION: SUPER EROGATORY -3.65
(-11.26,	3.96)
Constant 45.96***
(43.03,	48.90)
N 4944
Log	Likelihood -22788.0
AIC 45617.0
BIC 45747.0
***p	<	.01;	**p	<	.05;	*p	<	.1
The pattern found in Experiments 2 and 4 was replicated here (see Figure 8). 714
Supererogatory behaviors were judged as better and more permissible  (M = 85.16, SD = 19.31, n 715
= 618 and M = 84.47, SD = 20.18, n = 618) than suberogatory behaviors (M = 40.26 SD = 23.99,716
n = 618 and M = 64.55, SD = 30.09, n = 618) Good: t(4619) = -32.72, p < .001, Mdiff = -44.4, 717
95% CI [-47.3, -42.5] and Permissible: t(4619) = -14.51, p < .001, Mdiff = -19.9, 95% CI [-22.8, -718
17.1], regardless of being actions or omissions. Supererogatory behaviors were again judged to 719
be less optional (M = 28.43, SD = 30.61, n = 618) than the corresponding suberogatory responses 720
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(M = 24.93, SD = 26.34, n = 618), t(4619) = -2.55, p = .01, Mdiff = -3.50, 95% CI [-6.68, -0.31]. 721
As in Experiment 4 this difference only emerged when an additional measure was included 722
(blameworthiness in Exp 4 and social sanction in this Exp) suggesting the presence of a joint 723
evaluation effect (Hsee, Blount, Loewenstein, & Bazerman, 1999).724
Supererogatory behaviors were judged to merit more social recognition than suberogatory 725
responses  (M = 70.49, SD = 25.41, n = 618 vs M = 41.59, SD = 20.57, n = 618, t(4619) = -21.07, 726
p < .001, Mdiff = -28.9, 95% CI [-31.5, -26.3]). Crucially, both means for social recognition and 727
social sanction are significantly different from the indifference point (50 in our scale)728
(Supererogatory t(617) = 20.1, p < .001, M = 70.5, 95% CI [68.5, 72.5]  and suberogatory t(617) 729
= -10.2, p < .001, M = 41.5, 95% CI [40.0, 43.2]. Mirroring the asymmetric pattern observed for 730
blameworthiness ratings, supererogatory responses deserve more recognition than sanction is 731
deserved by suberogatory responses. Also, as in the previous studies there are important732
differences between scenarios, even when the overall pattern is consistent. For example, not 733
giving up the raffle prize does not merit neither recognition nor sanction (M = 50.82, SD = 22.06,734
n =155) while mowing your lawn early morning is clearly disapproved (M = 34.23, SD = 19.76,735
n = 155).  736
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737
Figure 8. Scores by type of judgment and condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence 738
interval.739
To explore the association between judgment scores and attitudes towards rights we first 740
observed the strength of the association between attitudes towards rights. Correlations are 741
medium to small in size (see Table 6) and there is low internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 742
0.50). We then calculated the correlations between judgment scores and these attitudes towards 743
rights (Table 6).  Similar to what happened with questions about duties, the correlations are low 744
and only significant for two associations: (1) bodily autonomy and permissibility, and; (2) 745
obligatoriness and right to property. Only when considering particular scenarios, moderately 746
stronger correlations start to emerge (for example, permissibility ratings in the Kidney scenario 747
are significantly correlated with attitudes on bodily autonomy r (309) = .12, p < 0.01)748
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Table 6. Bivariate correlations between attitudes towards rights and judgment scores 749
Permissible Good Obligatory Sanction Right to Money
Bodily 
autonomy
Permissible 
Good 0.54***
Obligatory -0.24** -0.04***
Sanction 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.14***
Right to money 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.01
Bodily autonomy -0.16** 0.05 -0.14 0.00 0.16***
Right to property 0.05 0.02 0.06* 0.01 0.44*** 0.17***
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Discussion750
We find the same dissociations observed in Experiments 2 and 4. Including the category of 751
sanctions, however, brings out something interesting. There is a much closer relationship 752
between goodness and sanction than there is between goodness and blame in suberogatory cases. 753
The relationship does not hold in cases of supererogatory behavior, where judgments of goodness 754
were statistically distinct from judgments of sanction (positive recognition, in this case). This 755
suggests that people think suberogatory actors should be sanctioned, though supererogatory 756
actors need not necessarily be positively recognized. This, however, might be a function of the 757
cases we used rather than marking out an intrinsic difference between commonsense thinking 758
about the sub- and supererogatory.759
We also identified an interesting relationship between sanction and goodness. Actions 760
rated as bad received similar ratings of sanction. In the previous experiment, we saw that ratings 761
of badness do not align with ratings of permissibility. Permissibility ratings are more closely 762
aligned with ratings of blame. This suggests that the permissibility of subererogatory behaviors is 763
related to blameworthiness, whereas the badness of suberogatory behaviors is related to public 764
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sanction. However, there is an asymmetry between subererogatory and supererogatory behaviors. 765
We discuss this pattern more in the General Discussion.766
Lastly, we did not find any interesting correlations between beliefs about rights and 767
different kinds of moral judgment. This was similar to our findings about individual sense of duty 768
in Experiment 2. This suggested the absence of general function from facts about individual 769
rights to behavior evaluation in moral encounters, providing further evidence that commonsense 770
thinking about morality does not reflect a structured system of rules.771
Experiment 6772
So far we have shown that judgments of permissibility, goodness, and obligation track 773
distinct features of a situation. Evaluations of supererogatory and suberogatory behaviors brings 774
these distinctions to light. One question that remains is what factors drive these different 775
judgments. The previous experiments offered some suggestions. In Experiment 1, we found that 776
participants used the language of rights to offer justifications for suberogatory behavior. 777
Additionally, they used virtue terms and aretaic categories in free descriptions of the scenarios. 778
Experiments 2, 4 and 5 suggest, however, that people are not explicitly taking into account their 779
attitudes towards duties (Exps. 2 and 4) or rights (Exp 5). This suggests two things. Judgments of 780
goodness might be sensitive to what people think a decent or virtuous person would do in a 781
situation, while judgments of permissibility track what some individual has the right to do in a 782
given situation. 783
If these suggestions are correct, it would explain why judgments of permissibility and 784
goodness often coincide: what is decent or virtuous often overlaps with what one has a right to 785
VARIETIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                    51
do. However, it also explains why the two concepts dissociate in cases of suberogatory behavior. 786
Suberogatory situations arise when someone has a right to do something that a virtuous or decent 787
person would not do. If this is the case, it is the absence of duties and the corresponding presence 788
of rights that are characteristic of suberogatory situations. These characteristics are, however, not 789
framed as rules, but are instead low-level features of the situation. 790
In this experiment, we explore the justifications people offer for their judgments of 791
permissibility and goodness to see whether these different factors explain the distinction between 792
these two kinds of judgment. We also include scenarios that are more perspicuously moral than 793
the ones previously used (e.g. lawn mowing or seat ownership). By providing situations with a 794
higher moral charge, we can be more confident that the responses observed so far are not merely 795
tracking the perceived conventional permissibility or social aptness of the behaviors evaluated. 796
Method797
Participants798
We recruited 316 participants (160 women and 153 men, mean age = 33.30, SD =10.81)799
through Prolific Academic to participate in the study in exchange for 60 pence. Sample size was 800
set to reproduce findings of Experiments 2, 4 and 5 but with a within participants design in this 801
case, which would allow us to increase statistical power. The average completion time was 10802
minutes and none of the participants had taken part in the previous experiments.803
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Materials and procedure804
We constructed two new scenarios and created a suberogatory and supererogatory version 805
of each. The two scenarios (adapted from Thomson, 1971 and Nozick, 1974, respectively) are 806
described below [suberogatory version in brackets]:807
Alex is driving home from work on the highway when she gets into an accident that knocks her 808
unconscious. When she wakes up, she finds herself in a hospital bed. She’s also connected to another individual 809
through a series of wires and tubes. A doctor enters the room and explains to Alex that she is fine, but the 810
individual she’s connected to suffered some severe damage to internal organs. Alex has the right blood type to 811
help, and—since she was unconscious—the doctor decided to connect Alex to keep the other individual alive for 812
the time being. The doctor explains that Alex can unplug herself if she chooses, but the individual will most likely 813
die. The individual will recover from these injuries in about a month (give or take a few days), after which time Alex 814
can unplug herself and leave. After a few hours of pondering what to do, Alex decides stay plugged in for the 815
month [to unplug herself].816
Jones finds a large freshwater source on his property, so he digs a well as a way of claiming the 817
water. A few weeks later, the town where he lives begins experiencing a drought, which was completely 818
unpredictable. Town representatives visit Jones to ask whether they can use his water to alleviate some of the 819
drought. Without Jones’ help, the town will likely run out of water in a few days. If Jones donates some of his 820
water, however, he might experience the effects of the drought in the unlikely event that the drought prolongs for 821
too long. After considering what to do, Jones decides to offer his water [declines to offer his water]822
To test variation against a known benchmark, we also included the Newlyweds scenario 823
(See Exp. 5). Participants read the informed consent and then rated each one of the three 824
vignettes. The order of the vignettes was randomized across participants. Each participant was 825
randomly assigned to see either the supererogatory or suberogatory condition of each scenario826
and the rest of the procedure was the same as in Experiment 4. The only difference is that, after 827
Violinist
Well
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providing judgment for the dimensions requested, participants were asked to explain their ratings 828
in their own words (cf. Christensen et al., 2014).829
Results830
Overall, numerical ratings closely followed the pattern observed in prior Experiments (See 831
Figure 9). Suberogatory behaviors are rated as worse (M = 34.19, SD = 23.71, n = 468 vs M =832
86.37, SD = 19.80, n = 480) , more blameworthy (M = 64.13, SD = 22.46, n = 468 vs M = 14.92,833
SD = 19.12, n = 480), and less permissible (M = 28.17, SD = 32.31, n = 468 vs M = 83.15, SD =834
22.27, n = 480) than supererogatory responses (all significant pairwise comparisons). Unlike 835
Experiment 5, there is no significant difference in obligatoriness judged (Suberogatory M =836
28.17, SD = 32.31, n = 468 vs M = 26.64, SD = 31.75, n = 480). As before, we fitted random 837
effect models, with a random intercept for participants. However, models with this term resulted 838
in singular fits, due to lack of variation for the random intercept for participant and suggesting an 839
overcomplex random structure (Matuschek, Kliegl,Vasishth, Baayen & Bates (2017). Therefore,840
we fitted only fixed effect models, where the best model includes the interaction of judgment 841
type, scenario and erogation condition (results can be seen in Table 7).842
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843
Figure 9. Mean scores by type of judgment Experiment 4. Error bars represent 95% confidence 844
intervals845
There is also a significant between-scenario variation. For example, only in the Well846
scenario people judged the suberogatory behavior, not giving water, as significantly less optional 847
than the supererogatory behavior (M = 31.26, SD = 31.75, n = 160 vs M = 38.81, SD = 34.63, n =848
156, Good: t(310)4 = 2.64, p < .001, Mdiff = 7.55, 95% CI [0.19, 14.9]). In this scenario also 849
occurred the most extreme values for suberogatory responses. 850
4 Degrees of freedom correspond to the Welch t-test, since the library emmeans (Lenth, 2020) 
calculated the asymptotic result for this comparison (value from the z distribution). 
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851
Table	7.	Summary	of	Best	Model	fitted	for	Experiment 6
score
GOOD -18.65***
(-24.33,	-12.97)
OBLIGATORY -43.06***
(-48.74,	-37.38)
PERMISSIBLE 14.01***
(8.33,	19.70)
SUPER_EROGATORY -35.49***
(-41.08,	-29.89)
Violinist 3.61
(-2.02,	9.24)
Well 13.13***
(7.48,	18.79)
GOOD:	SUPER_EROGATORY 77.22***
(69.31,	85.13)
OBLIGATORY:	SUPER_EROGATORY 36.02***
(28.11,	43.93)
PERMISSIBLE:	SUPER_EROGATORY 50.07***
(42.16,	57.98)
GOOD:	Violinist -7.79*
(-15.75,	0.17)
OBLIGATORY:	Violinist 10.88***
(2.92,	18.84)
PERMISSIBLE:	Violinist -10.41**
(-18.37,	-2.45)
GOOD:	Well -25.91***
(-33.91,	-17.91)
OBLIGATORY:	Well 10.22**
(2.22,	18.22)
PERMISSIBLE:	Well -29.89***
(-37.89,	-21.89)
SUPER_EROGATORY:	Violinist -17.16***
(-25.07,	-9.25)
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SUPER_EROGATORY:	Well -24.19***
(-32.10,	-16.28)
GOOD:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Violinist 27.74***
(16.56,	38.93)
OBLIGATORY:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Violinist 19.66***
(8.47,	30.84)
PERMISSIBLE:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Violinist 12.94**
(1.76,	24.13)
GOOD:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Well 44.97***
(33.79,	56.16)
OBLIGATORY:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Well 16.10***
(4.91,	27.29)
PERMISSIBLE:	SUPER_EROGATORY:	Well 39.84***
(28.66,	51.03)
Constant 58.52***
(54.51,	62.54)
N 3792
Log	Likelihood -17629.00
AIC 35306.00
***p	<	.01;	**p	< .05;	*p	<	.1
852
853
854
For the qualitative analysis of the open responses, we used two coders. Both were blind to 855
the individual ratings associated with each open response and one coder was completely blind to 856
the objective of the study. Coders used ten predefined categories to sort responses. We report 857
agreement between coders (Cohens Kappa) and results from fitting loglinear models on the 858
classification frequencies.859
There were 4003 unique written explanations of ratings (1004 for goodness ratings, 999860
for obligatory ratings, 997 for permissibility ratings and 1003 for blame/praise ratings). Coders 861
Qualitative data
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were given ten categories. Character when the response included some mention of personality or 862
character traits; Rights (presence or absence) when responses appealed to what the protagonist 863
can morally do, is allowed to do, or its explicit negation; Duties (presence or absence) when864
responses appeal to what the protagonist is morally obliged to do, or its explicit negation; Neither865
when participants appealed to norms that could not be considered rights nor duties, etc; Outcomes 866
when the justification was based on the consequences for the “victims”, negative or positive; 867
Values actions performed had a clear valence; Justification when appealing to reasons not based 868
on consequences; Other if the response did not fall in the previous categories but was common 869
enough to merit its own. Coders were given an example of each one of the categories. Raters 870
completed coding independently. They were also told that they could classify any given response 871
in more than one category.872
For example, one response to the Well vignette reads: “He didn’t have to donate the water, 873
and even if he didn’t that wouldn’t be necessarily a bad thing.” This was rated as indicating 874
‘Absence of Duties’ and ‘Values’. Another response (to the Newlyweds vignette) reads: “No one 875
should have to switch a seat unless they want to. They bought the seat they were in and would 876
have been justified in staying in that seat.” This was rated as indicating ‘Justification’ and 877
‘Presence of Rights’.878
Raw agreement between coders and Cohen’s Kappa for each category are presented in 879
Table 8. The category Neither is not presented because there was virtually no agreement in its 880
use. Most of the unique responses were classified into at least 2 categories (58%). Half of the 881
categories show a weak reliability between coders (outcomes, values, justification and absence of 882
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rights) while the other half shows an overall good agreement (presence of duties, character, 883
presence of rights and absence of duties).884
Table 8. Cohen's kappa agreement between coders for the eight categories. Columns L and 885
U are the Lower and Upper limits of Cohen’s confidence interval.886
Kappa L U % Classified as % Agreement
Abs duties 0.81 0.79 0.84 11.02 95.68
Pres rights 0.75 0.73 0.77 21.06 90.50
Character 0.69 0.65 0.72 8.61 94.18
Pres duties 0.63 0.58 0.68 5.65 95.25
Outcomes 0.39 0.35 0.43 11.86 85.08
Values 0.38 0.35 0.42 20.28 77.18
Justification 0.37 0.34 0.41 13.7 82.35
Abs rights 0.34 0.27 0.41 3.13 95.15
To determine the association between justification category and the variables manipulated 887
in this experiment, we submitted the classification frequencies to a loglinear analysis with a 888
saturated model including erogation condition (sub and supererogatory), judgment dimension 889
(goodness, permissibility, obligatoriness, blameworthiness) and justification classification 890
category (presence of duties, character, presence of rights and absence of duties). The three-way 891
loglinear model produced a model that retained all interactive effects (likelihood ratio χ2 (0) = 0, 892
p = 1), indicating a significant interaction between the variables fitted to the model (χ2 (12) = 893
102.53, p < 0.001). Judgments of permissibility and obligatoriness were mainly sensitive to 894
presence of rights and these explanations appealing to the presence of rights were more prevalent 895
in suberogatory cases. Judgments of permissibility were also justified by appealing mostly to the 896
absence of duties and the presence of rights (>40%) but in this case there is no asymmetry 897
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between sub and supererogatory response. Judgments of goodness were mostly justified by 898
appealing to character and again the suberogatory responses were justified by relying on presence 899
of rights. Additionally, there are more character justifications for supererogatory responses based 900
on character than for the corresponding suberogatory responses.901
The qualitative analysis of the open explanations suggests that people do systematically 902
call to mind considerations on duties and rights when making judgments about permissibility and 903
obligatoriness. While this is not surprising, the interesting thing here is that these considerations 904
are also significant for judgments of blameworthiness and goodness. Duties and rights showed 905
up, not as blank generalizations – as explored in Experiments 2 and 5 – but as situated appeals to 906
factors of the situation. 907
Discussion908
As before, we replicated the basic pattern found in our other experiments using two 909
situations that are more clearly moral. This provides strong evidence for our claim that 910
differences in evaluative categories track differences in kinds of moral judgments.911
We also used open responses to allow participants to supply their own reasoning for 912
making different moral judgments. Our results are striking. People appear to be sensitive to many 913
kinds of information differentially when making moral judgments. Judgments of praise and 914
blame are sensitive to character considerations. Judgments of goodness seem primarily sensitive 915
to character considerations, whereas judgments of badness seem sensitive to both character 916
considerations and the presence of rights. This, however, might be a function of the situations we 917
provided. When people make judgments of badness, they were often pointing to the fact that the 918
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bad behavior was fully within the rights of the individual, even though the behavior was 919
indicative of vicious character. The fact that people mention both points to the relevance of both 920
kinds of information to making a judgment of badness. Judgments of permissibility appear to 921
track the presence of rights and the absence of duties, whereas judgments of obligatoriness track 922
the presence of rights and the presence or absence of duties. We offer an interpretation of this in 923
the general discussion.924
Finally, we should note that the categories used to sort open responses were generated a 925
priori. Bottom-up, data-driven methods might reveal a more perspicuous classificatory scheme 926
that might generate surprising results about the kinds of information relevant to making different 927
kinds of moral judgment.928
General Discussion929
In this paper, our goal was to develop the idea that morality is not exhausted by a system 930
of rules and explore some of its implication for our understanding of the psychology of moral 931
judgment. To do this, we’ve made a case for moving beyond the use of dilemmas in the study of 932
moral judgment and propose a wider array of measures and situations. In this General Discussion, 933
we summarize how our findings apply to the measurement of moral judgment, the cases used to 934
elicit judgments, and the rule-based view of morality.935
Measures and Categories of Moral Judgment936
We found that judgments across different moral categories are dissociable. In particular, 937
judgments of goodness and permissibility come apart depending on the situation presented. 938
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People form judgments about situations that conform to the category of the suberogatory (bad, 939
but permissible). This challenges the idea that different measures of moral judgment tap into the 940
same underlying reasoning process. The resulting picture of moral judgment is that people are 941
variably sensitive to different kinds of considerations when making different kinds of judgments942
(see Barbosa and Jiménez-Leal, 2017). While this presents a more granular picture of moral 943
judgment, it also opens up new questions. When do people prefer different kinds of information 944
in making moral judgments? What sorts of considerations predominantly drive different kinds of 945
judgments?946
Our results provide some initial suggestion for how to answer these questions. In many of 947
our experiments, ratings of obligation remained consistently low. This indicates that people 948
considered both suberogatory and supererogatory behaviors as optional rather than obligatory. 949
The qualitative data from Experiment 6 suggests that ratings of obligation are predominantly 950
tracking the presence of duties or explicit rules that prohibit or prescribe conduct. Because the 951
situations considered here are not composed of conflicts between rules, there is an absence of 952
duties that defines how one ought to behave. Hence, ratings of obligation are low.953
Results from Experiment 5 indicate that ratings of badness align with ratings of sanction. 954
That is, the degree to which one rates a suberogatory action as bad is related to amount of 955
sanction one deserves in light of doing something suberogatory. This is importantly different 956
from the results of Experiment 4, which indicated that ratings of permissibility are aligned with 957
ratings of blame. 958
These results suggest that folk psychological categories of blame and sanction might 959
dissociate. Because these categories differentially associate with others, it might be the case that 960
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these judgments track different features of a situation. Understanding this difference might 961
provide further insight into what judgments of permissibility and goodness indicate about folk 962
psychological evaluation. This is an important result to investigate in future work. Moral 963
psychologists and philosophers have assumed that these constructs significantly overlap and, 964
accordingly, have used them interchangeably (Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Deutsch & Gerard, 965
1955; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Scanlon, 2008; McKenna, 2013; Bennett, 2012). Future 966
work should investigate further whether and under what circumstances there are reliable 967
dissociations between these categories.968
Notably, some have mentioned the need for using new measures in studying moral 969
judgment (see Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015), arguing that folk psychological categories 970
of judgment are fundamentally directed at personal evaluation rather than behavior evaluation971
and routinely employs aretaic rather than deontic concepts. Our results suggest that this is 972
partially true. People do show an interest in personal evaluation using aretaic concepts. However, 973
we also find that behavior evaluation and deontic concepts also play a significant role. This 974
suggests that social cognition is sensitive to both act-based and person-based considerations, as 975
well as a wide conceptual repertoire in normative evaluation. 976
Moral Situations977
Using a variety of measures is not sufficient to bring out the underlying variability of 978
moral judgment. In Experiment 3 (on sacrificial dilemmas), we did not find similar dissociations 979
between judgment categories as we did in our other experiments. This was the case even when 980
controlling for underlying ethical tendencies (i.e., low or high trait utilitarianism). Even among 981
low trait utilitarians, different kinds of judgments never significantly differed from each other. 982
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This suggests that dilemmas themselves are qualitatively distinct from the kind of moral 983
encounters we used in our experiments.984
As discussed earlier, assumptions about methodology and dilemmas mutually reinforce 985
each other. We can now clarify this point further. The use of dilemmas as stimuli functions as a 986
demand effect that gives the appearance of commonsense moral thinking exhibiting a rule-based, 987
hierarchical structure. In providing scenarios that explicitly bring different sets of rules into 988
conflict, researchers have set people up to exhibit judgments that appear to preferentially select 989
some rules over others (deontological prescription vs. maximization principles). This, in turn, 990
blurs the distinctions between different judgment categories. Once we free moral judgment of the 991
constraints of dilemmas, variegated measures capture better the variability and nuance of992
judgment. That variability is only possible when using situations that do not bring different sets 993
of rules into conflict.994
Different situations also allow for a different kind of variability. Moral dilemmas have 995
mostly been constructed out of examples designed to test abstract philosophical principles. which 996
has led to worries about their ecological validity (Kahane, 2015; Dahl & Oftedal, 2019). A 997
related but, perhaps more significant, concern is that dilemmas, because of their abstract and 998
artificial nature, likely occlude differences in moral attitudes that arise from socio-cultural 999
variation. Thus, in the limited number of studies that have been conducted outside the urban areas 1000
of North America and Western Europe, researchers have found responses similar to those found 1001
among WEIRD populations (Abarbanell & Hauser, 2010; Barrett et al., 2016; Koenigs et al., 1002
2007; Perkins et al., 2013; Szekely & Miu, 2015; Johnson, Danko, Huang, Park, Johnson, & 1003
Nagoshi, 1987). 1004
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By contrast, it is likely that responses that are deemed suberogatory in one community, 1005
such as tipping 10%, might be considered supererogatory by another one. As cultural variability 1006
mediates moral learning, it is plausible to conjecture that different cultures assign varying 1007
weights to values, virtues, and rules in the justification of their moral judgments (Graham, 1008
Meindl, Beall, Johnson & Zhang, 2016). Consequently, cultural differences can be observed not 1009
as variation in a dimension (e.g. being more or less utilitarian) but as a particular pattern of 1010
judgements and their justifications. At present, we do not have results that speaks directly to 1011
these issues—although we currently have relevant work in preparation. We do think, however, 1012
that moving beyond dilemmas opens up the possibility for this variability to emerge. 1013
Rule-based Morality1014
We mentioned at the outset that not all moral situations reflect conflicts between rules. 1015
Our results show that when people approach some of these situations and are asked to evaluate 1016
them, they bring to bear a variety of considerations, not all of which are codifiable in rules. This 1017
strongly suggests that moral judgment does not necessarily rely on the application of abstract 1018
moral principles. 1019
In Experiments 2, 4 and 5, we asked participants to fill questionnaires aimed at measuring 1020
general attitudes towards duties and rights. We failed to find correlations between their attitudes 1021
toward abstract claims about the nature of rights and duties and their judgments about particular 1022
situations. This reflects a tendency of people to identify features of situations that guide judgment 1023
without having explicit representations of abstract principles play a causal role in forming moral 1024
judgments (Graham et al., 2013). Likewise, the open responses we collected in Experiment 6 1025
suggest that rules play a role in structuring commonsense moral thinking alongside axiological 1026
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and characterological considerations, at least when it comes to explaining proffered moral 1027
judgements. In particular, as indicated by the responses under the “absence of duties” category, 1028
participants judged actions to be good, bad, etc., while explaining that these didn’t violate a 1029
prohibition (in suberogatory cases) or were not generally mandated (in supererogatory cases). 1030
Instead, their evaluations seem overwhelmingly responsive to considerations about rights, values, 1031
and character traits.1032
For all we have said, it may turn out that precise algorithms adequately characterize the 1033
computations performed in forming moral judgments. Alternatively, moral judgment might be1034
supported by an architecture that functions as a model-based system without having to explicitly 1035
represent rules (see Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2015; Brownstein, 2018). Our interest here, 1036
however, does not lie with the computations or cognitive architecture behind moral judgment, but 1037
with the content of morality. Our claim is that most research on moral judgment has, thus far, 1038
assumed that the content of moral judgment can be measured in terms of its alignment with some 1039
structured system of moral rules. But fixating on rules provides only a partial window into the 1040
moral life, one that fails to reveal the complexities and subtleties of commonsense moral 1041
judgment. When moral judgment is removed from the narrow frame of sacrificial dilemmas, the 1042
appearance of rules in moral judgment evaporates. 1043
Finally, our argument here does not assume that if morality has a rule-based structure, 1044
then commonsense moral judgment ought to exhibit perfectly coherent and systematic principles. 1045
Even Sidgwick (1981) admits that the maxims of commonsense morality are “somewhat vague 1046
generalities” (p. 342). Still, on his view and on the view of those who follow him, commonsense 1047
morality can be refined through rigorous theorizing to approximate the structure of an ideal 1048
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normative theory. It’s made of the right sort of stuff, as it were, to function as a rule-based 1049
system.1050
The judgments that we have identified in these experiments, however, imply that this is an 1051
incomplete view of the moral framework reflected in moral cognition. Consider that people 1052
regularly judge that some behavior is bad but permissible across a range of different scenarios. If 1053
there are rules constitutive of commonsense morality, what must they be like such that they allow 1054
for such judgments? How can we make sense of such judgments within a rule-governed system? 1055
Recall that one key feature of the rule-based system of morality is the inter-definability of moral 1056
concepts. Whatever is permissible is in line with the rules of morality; whatever is bad is bad 1057
because it goes against those rules. 1058
One option is to say that separate domains of rules govern separate judgments. But that 1059
requires giving up on the notion of inter-definability that is central to the rule-based system of 1060
morality. Another option is to say that one kind of judgment is properly moral and the other is 1061
not. However, there appears to be no principled way of stating that either judgments of 1062
permissibility or goodness are properly moral while excluding the other. A third option is to say 1063
that there are systematic principles underlying these judgments, but people do not understand 1064
what these are. Hence, they are making a mistake in dissociating permissibility and goodness. 1065
Lastly, one could argue that morality is self-contradictory. 1066
While all of this is possible in principle, the attempt to defend these answers in the face of 1067
the evidence presented here begins to look like the imposition of researcher assumptions rather 1068
than an investigation into commonsense moral thinking. At this point, one begins to wonder if 1069
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the substantive assumption about morality being a system of rules is worth the cost. We suggest 1070
that it is not, and that it is time to consider what morality beyond the rules would look like.1071
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